DECLASSIFICATION THE 6/10/17)
PER Wischmung OFFICE FUN
FADRO FOI CASE NO. 62029 Bumbaum

TO:

The Secretary

The Secretary

The Under Secretary REVENDED b

THROUGH: S/S

FROM:

S/P - W. W. VROSEON

SUBJECT: Alliance Missiles.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVENUED by

October 26, 1962

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From all my diplomatic contacts, including, for example, a breakfast with Kim and the Korean Ambassador this morning, it is clear to me that to our Allies the measure of our success or failure in this crisis will be whether we get the missiles out of Cuba without negotiating away any Free World assets. Anxiety in this respect has come to rest, even among Koreans, on the Turkish missiles.

It seems to me extremely urgent, therefore, that, along a track wholly independent of the crisis, we, building on the MRBM effort in the North Atlantic Council, find a method for signaling diplomatically a clear-cut decision on the multi-lateral MRBM proposal, even though it will evidently take time fully to implement. In this connection, you should see a report of the Turkish Ambassador's conversation with Mr. Talbot on this subject.

Such a decision in principle now would have two effects. If the Soviets wish to read it as a way of helping get them off the hook, they would be free to do so; on the other hand, it would nail down the missile position of the Alliance and make the kind of deal the Soviets may have in mind, contraded to disrupt the confidence of the Alliance in the U.S.,

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One expeditious way of proceeding might be to act on Ambassador Finletter's proposal (POLTO 506) that we set up a small Southern Command multilateral seaborne force on a pilot basis, deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean, and manned by Turkish, Italian, U.S., and possibly Greek, mixed crews.

Such a step, as a precursor to establishment of a larger multilateral sea-based force would reaffirm our nuclear commitment to Europe's defense, make clear that we would not make deals at Allied expense, and also perhaps pave the way for: (1) Turkish and Italian statements that they would phase out IRBMs in view of this substitute; (2) a possible exchange of U.S. and Soviet declarations that they would not fractitate procurement of MRBMs for land-based national deployment in NATO and Warse, fall countries outside the U.S. and the USSR (based on our related statements that we would only facilitate procurement of MRBMs for a multilateral seabased force).